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Why do CEOs resign? This is an important question given the impact CEOs have 
economically and in society (Hambrick & Quigley, 2014). A common view is that CEOs 
resign because shareholders and the board want them to leave because of lower-than-
expected performance. The implication here is that power resides with shareholders and the 
board, with CEOs sitting around passively waiting for their fates to be decided.  After all,  
CEOs are compensated extremely well for delivering results.  So it seems only fair that their 
positions are precarious and in the hands of shareholders and board members. Yet in many 
cases, the reasons CEOs resign are murky and appear to have little to do with performance.  
Consequently, in a recent paper, Yun Liu from the University of California at Riverside 
Director Gender and Firm Acquisition Behavior 2 
 
challenged the dominant notion that CEO resignations are shareholder and board driven.  
Instead, Liu attempted to shed more light on why CEOs resign by adopting their perspective.  
Specifically, Liu argues that CEOs often resign not because they are forced out, but 
because they find better deals elsewhere. Liu based his premise on employment contracting 
theory, particularly its idea of “participation constraint.”  Basically, the notion is that 
someone will stick with a current employment contract as long as he or she believes they are 
not worse off relative to outside opportunities. When, and if, someone perceives that better 
prospects exist elsewhere, then the current contract may be abandoned.  In the case of CEOs, 
this simply means that CEOs may leave because they can land better deals in other firms or 
institutions.  
But since executive and director positions are rarely advertised and few and far 
between to begin with, how do CEOs obtain information about such opportunities elsewhere? 
Liu believes that access to such information comes from CEOs own personal networks or 
“connectedness.”   We know that connectedness generally plays a role in finding employment 
and moving up the corporate ladder (Bozionelos, in press). However, Liu considers that 
connectedness is particularly important for CEOs because most information on executive 
openings is not publicly available. Furthermore, being an executive and overtly looking for 
employment opportunities involves some risk (e.g., one’s motives and loyalties may be 
questioned). Finally, unlike most other types of hiring, there is very little margin for error 
when it comes to CEOs—an outstanding fit between candidate and position is imperative. 
Consequently, connectedness may be crucial both for executives on the lookout for new 
opportunities and for firms seeking to fill executive positions.  
In a nutshell, Liu developed and tested the idea that CEOs with richer networks are 
more likely to leave their firm for an opportunity elsewhere.  
Study Design & Method 
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Liu used the Board Ex database to extract detailed information on more than 7,500 
CEOs from nearly 5,000 publicly held firms over an 18-year period (1991-2009).   During 
this timeframe, nearly 3,000 CEO resignations took place in the firms studied.  
Liu also used the database to construct the personal networks or connectedness of these 
CEOs. Subsequently, Liu linked these data with data from other databases, such as 
Compustat and CRSP, which provide financial information on the firms involved. On 
average, each CEO had ties with 12 other executives in each given year. Liu measured 
connectedness with an index that reflects the richness or variety of information CEOs have 
access to. The more varied the information a CEO can access via his or her ties with directors 
outside and inside the firm, the greater their connectedness. Liu investigated the relationships 
between CEOs’ connectedness and their mobility up to two years after their resignations from 
their current position. In his calculations, Liu took into account characteristics of both firms 
and of CEOs themselves (such as education and personality).  As a result, he was able to 
isolate the influence of connectedness on mobility and produce generalizable conclusions. 
Liu identified three types of destinations for CEOs who resigned.  About two thirds of 
these CEOs took positions internal to the firm, usually chairman of the board or executive 
director.  About 20% took full-time positions outside the firm--normally CEO positions in 
other firms.  Finally, almost a third of the sample took part-time positions outside the firm, 
normally non-executive directorships in other firms. There was also a respectable proportion 
of CEOs (about 14%) who took no new position after resigning. An interesting finding was 
that those aged 60 and above were more likely to hold a new position two years after 
resigning than those below 60! This illustrates that CEOs who leave at “normal” retirement 
age (that is 60 and above) remain very active in their work lives, perhaps more active that 
their much younger counterparts.   
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Key Findings 
Liu’s findings confirmed that the greater the CEO connectedness the greater the 
probability of CEO resignation.  Indeed, for every one standard deviation increase in 
connectedness the chance of CEO resignation increased roughly 10%. This was in line with 
Liu’s idea that CEO resignations are often driven by their connectedness.   Interestingly, 
connectedness with other executives inside the firm reduced the probability of CEO 
resignation.  So on the one hand, richer links with executives in other firms seem to increase 
the likelihood that CEOs will leave while stronger connections within the firm seem to make 
it less likely.  That said, the results also showed that a substantial proportion of CEO 
resignations were indeed linked to poor firm performance, which is in line with common 
perceptions about why CEOs leave.  
Next, Liu tested whether resignations were related to the nature of external 
opportunities available (full-time or part-time) via connectedness. His results showed that 
CEO connectedness increased the probability of resignation for a full-time position elsewhere 
(such as becoming CEO in another firm) only for CEOs below 60 years of age. Similarly, a 
decline in firm performance was associated with increased probability of CEO resignation, 
but again mostly for “young” CEOs. These findings basically mean that “young” CEOs are 
more likely to use their connections in order to find more alluring CEO positions in other 
firms. On the other hand, the reverse pattern was found for part-time positions.  In  short, 
“old” CEOs were more likely to use their connections to become non-executive directors in 
other firms. Such positions include good financial packages and prestige, but are less time 
demanding—perhaps ideal for CEOs at retirement age.  
So the results clearly suggested that connectedness may help identify alternative 
opportunities for CEOs, prompting them to resign to take CEO positions in other firms or to 
retire and take a non-executive position somewhere else. Naturally the next issue that Liu 
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examined was which explanation – outside opportunities or poor performance –weighs 
heavier in CEO resignations.  Importantly, his analysis showed that connectedness increased 
the probability of resignation to seek a CEO or non-executive position somewhere else more 
than poor performance did.  
In the final step, Liu investigated whether connectedness was related to probability of 
resignation under particular conditions of firm performance. As it turned out, while CEO 
connectedness was related to the probability of CEO resignation under all performance 
conditions  (poor, medium and strong), the relationship was especially strong when firms 
were performing poorly. 
According to Liu this may mean that well-performing CEOs have less need to rely on 
their connections to move to other firms because their records will “speak for themselves.” 
On the other hand, poor performers must counterbalance their poor outcomes with additional 
information if they are to move on--and their networking serves as a conduit for transmitting 
such information. Furthermore, Liu pointed out that high performing CEOs may find it best 
to continue with their current firms because those firms are likely to reward them with even 
better conditions and pay. On the other hand, poorly performing CEOs may have limited 
futures within the firm and may also experience internal pressure to resign. This may leave 
them with few alternatives other than any outside opportunity that they learn about through 
their networks.  
Conclusions & Implications 
CEO turnover is an important corporate event. Liu explored a new dimension in CEO 
resignation by taking the perspective of CEOs themselves and considering them as actors that 
shape their own future rather than as passive objects who simply react to board demands and 
decisions.  His findings suggested that options outside their current firm influence CEOs 
resignations beyond their performance. This means that in many cases CEOs leave not 
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because they are fired but because their networks with other executives help them uncover 
better opportunities outside their firms.  
Overall, well-connected CEOs appear more likely to leave their firms than poorly 
connected ones. In addition, poor performing CEOs seem especially keen to use their 
networks to find external jobs, probably because of limited internal opportunities and 
pressure to leave. And while well-performing CEOs with richer networks may also leave, 
they will likely have more to gain by staying put.  
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